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FLEXICURITY AS A POLICY
AGENDA
PETER AUER* AND
BERNARD GAZIER**
A remarkable success, not without criticisms
and scepticism
The numerous declarations, communications and de-
cisions made by the EU Commission as well as the
many reports and articles written by Europeans on
flexicurity bear witness to the success of this concept,
at least on paper. Even in the US the Danish model
has been enthusiastically discussed by prominent
commentators and economists, such as Robert
Kuttner and Dani Rodrik. The concept is now well-
known worldwide, and seminars on flexicurity have
taken place in such diverse countries as Argentina,
China, India and Vietnam. More importantly, flexi-
curity is now the overriding guideline for labour
market reform in the EU. Research and policy action
following the “common principles of flexicurity” that
were adopted by the Lisbon ministerial council in
late 2007 have been increasingly funded by EU
sources.
Despite this increasing institutionalisation and sup-
port from many quarters, there are also critical voic-
es, both from academia and from the unions.
Recently the Swedish labour economist Lars Calm-
fors wrote a critical review of the concept and found
that important trade-offs are “swept under the car-
pet”, maintaining the illusion of a win-win situation.
He underlines the danger “that the practice of trying
to subsume a number of different policy approaches
under the common heading of ‘flexicurity’ leads to
less clarity regarding the policy options” (Calmfors
2007).
Numerous attempts have been made at clarifying the
various interpretations, meanings and uses of the
term (e.g., Jorgensen and Madsen 2007; Wilthagen et
al. 2007; Schmid 2008). In this article flexicurity will
be seen as one of several policy agendas currently
being discussed and its place amongst these investi-
gated.This departure point has two main advantages.
First it directs the attention towards the very nature
of the flexicurity approach, which is neither a fully
integrated theory nor a set of independent policy
prescriptions. Second, it reintegrates it into a wider
policy debate, which has been dominated for a long
time by the demand for more flexibility and reac-
tions to that demand.
The nature and rise of policy agendas: a problem of
“soft co-ordination”
Regional groupings comprising countries that are
jealous of their prerogatives and room for manoeu-
vring, as is the case in the EU, presently rely on the
subsidiarity principle and on “soft” laws. This is not
true for all areas,1 but in particular for social,
employment and labour market policies and re-
forms. In this context “soft” steering devices like the
“open method of co-ordination” and “bottom-up
policy implementation” (with an active role played
by national/local actors at every level of responsibil-
ity) are a politically feasible approach that enables
countries to develop their own approaches. This also
applies to international organisations that often have
virtually no hold on their member countries other
than peer pressure, except in areas were binding
minimum rules and follow-up are agreed upon.
Policy agendas and strategies are usually not bind-
ing, but it may be possible to achieve some conver-
gence in policies by setting targets and by developing
guidelines and recommendations. While the Euro-
pean Employment Strategy is the most developed of
these strategies, there are similar strategies at work
in other international arenas, such as the OECD
Jobs Strategy (1994, reassessed in 2006) and the
Decent Work Agenda of the ILO of 1999, which also
has an employment strategy arm, the Global Em-
ployment Agenda.
FLEXICURITY
These “strategies” and “agendas” go beyond a simple
collection of proposed measures with a timetable (a
“plan”) and propose an organised set of reasons and
measurements underlying several measures and
“plans”.They are not directly deduced from one pre-
cise and unique theoretical perspective, nor do they
simply arise from practice and experience. Policy
agendas may be considered an intermediate body of
more or less strictly interrelated arguments that
point to one broad policy direction and classify pri-
orities accordingly in a more or less strict hierarchi-
cal order. A set of policy perspectives can become a
policy agenda if three conditions are met:
i. It develops ends, means, targets and indicators;
ii. It integrates those four elements into a auto-
nomous strategic approach;
iii. It imposes, through these elements and their jus-
tifications, evidence in favour of one particular,
but broadly defined policy option.
Policy agendas may be seen as deliberate interven-
tions aimed at transforming existing systems of ref-
erences in a given field and pointing them in a new
direction. They provide a form of cognitive evidence
using concepts, values and evaluations. They are
developed by experts and policymakers and are re-
fined through debates; they appear in a pluralistic
context because they are diverse and perhaps com-
pete with each other.
Four policy agendas
In the field of labour market and social policies, flex-
icurity coexists with at least three other agendas: flex-
ibility, capabilities and transitional labour markets.
Flexibility
Neo-liberalism is acknowledged by many to be a
dominating2 reform agenda that entails administer-
ing strong doses of flexibility as a cure. Since the
1980s, the claim has been that in a period where all
other markets (goods, services and financial) are
increasingly liberalised, the labour markets cannot
remain regulated, as changes in the other three will
spill over to them. According to this view, the mar-
kets (workers) have to adapt and the preferred
adaptation channel, in the absence of total wage flex-
ibility, is the (external numerical) mobility of work-
ers and smooth worker reallocation, preferably
unhindered by government intervention.
The US labour market still holds as a model for this
approach. The World Economic Outlook (IMF
2003) predicted gains in growth and employment
and decreases in unemployment if Europe chose to
adopt US type low labour market level regulations.
A low level of regulation is also a condition for being
well ranked on the World Bank’s doing business
indicators (World Bank, 2004–08). Of concern here
in particular is the Employing Workers Indicator
(EWI), a set of regulations concerning flexibility/
rigidity in terms of working hours and hiring and fir-
ing. These indicators (and the ranking) very strongly
suggest that labour market regulations are a pure
cost of doing business. As a result of the EWI rank-
ing, the old American flexibility/European sclerosis
debate has resurfaced. For example Germany and
France are ranked 137 and 144, while the US is num-
ber 1.3
The flexibility reform agenda treats the exchange of
goods on the labour market just as any other good.
As a result this agenda is not concerned with work-
er’s employment security or (wage) distribution poli-
cies as they would distort the market. The propo-
nents of the flexibility agenda might not be particu-
larly anti-worker (but anti-union, certainly) because
in their equations more flexibility equals increased
workers’ welfare: benefits will simply trickle down as
a result of improved economic and labour market
performance ensuing from the enhanced adjustment
capacities of labour markets. In short: “Easier firing
brings about easier hiring”.The market will bring the
best of all worlds, whereas interventions to correct
market failures will not work, leaving little space for
polity, policy and ethics. Surely this picture is a cari-
cature of the complexities of thoughts and methods
that the proponents of flexibility have developed,
but at the core, such thinking prevails.
Capabilities
The flexibility agenda ignores the particular “good
or service” that is exchanged on labour markets,
which cannot be isolated from the individuals that
offer their services for money. They and their fami-
lies’ livelihood as well as their psychological, social
and economic well- being are in fact dependent on
what they earn.4 This leads us to the second reform
agenda, which is based on something quite different,
namely on capabilities. This approach is oriented
towards developing countries, although the concept
claims universal application as can be seen in the
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Human Development Indicators, which are also rel-
evant for developed countries. It appears to be based
less on labour market and employment issues, but
more on basic needs and social justice.
It sets a list of priorities established independently
from how the labour market functions: health (life
expectancy), wealth (per capita income in PPPs) and
education (enrolment and literacy rates). These
three main issues comprise many additional criteria,
such as housing, literacy, access to water and school-
ing, active participation in political and social life,
also with respect to gender, etc.All these factors may
be seen as preconditions for a sustainable social and
economic life, and are, of course, developed inde-
pendently by specialised agencies and government
departments of each individual country. The objec-
tives set up for various actors, such as social workers,
are based on them. One can speak of an agenda
when these elements are combined in an integrated
way. Although oriented more towards the world-of-
work, the Decent Work Agenda of the ILO (ILO
1999) often refers to this approach.
The theoretical reference is the “basic need” concept
established by the ILO, which has given way to a
“capabilities” theory. It focuses on a specific kind of
equality that draws on the use of both resources and
capacities provided by both physical and cultural
conditions. The capability of using “substantive free-
doms” to achieve well-being (welfare) is at the core
of this doctrine (Sen 1985 and Nussbaum 2000).
Martha Nussbaum (2000) has shown what kind of
capabilities are at stake (e.g., life, health, affiliation,
control over one’s environment, etc.). The human
development indicators that were developed follow-
ing the ideas of Armatya Sen (Sen 1982) are based
on the three main areas cited above (wealth, health
and education).
Flexicurity
Flexicurity was originally developed as an alterna-
tive concept to the “flexibility only” mantra of many
stakeholders together with other concepts such as
Transitional Labour Markets. Dating back to the
Dutch debates about temporary work (1997), it de-
veloped out of a concern that flexibility could under-
mine security if institutions are not made compatible
with changes in the labour market. Changes towards
more flexibility, which are either deliberately sought5
or already existing,6 should be compensated or
accompanied by better (new or reformed) security
devices inside and outside firms. The concrete forms
of the institutions outside firms’ internal labour mar-
kets are subject to debate, but there is some agree-
ment that unemployment benefit schemes, education
and training, work and training schemes, job coun-
selling and worker’s accompaniment and placement,
workers reallocation in restructuring situations, etc.,
are the core providers of this external form of secu-
rity. The concept also emphasises negotiations
between the social partners as the main avenue to
manage change.
There are more or less encompassing concepts of
flexicurity (Gazier 2008). Sometimes the concept is
in a “reduced form”, comprising a “golden triangle”
of external adjustment between (loose) employment
protection, generous unemployment benefits and
active labour market policies negotiated by the so-
cial partners (e.g., the Danish model as in Madsen
2003). Sometimes it includes a whole array of insti-
tutions and social rights as in the recently developed
concept of the “common principles of flexicurity” of
the EU Commission (EU Commission 2007). The
common principles comprise new contractual ar-
rangements, active labour market policies, life-long
learning and a modern social protection system
(which in itself is composed of an array of policies).
Emphasis is also placed on the negotiation of policy
combinations through dialogue between the social
partners. It includes internal and external flexibility,
insiders and outsiders, and should be gender sensi-
tive and cost effective.
Economically and ethically, flexicurity is interpreted,
allowing for some adjustment, as a win-win game
because it also provides security to workers. An
important ethical dimension of this approach in-
volves the rights and duties of the social partners,
and therefore individual responsibility. Economics
needs politics for equitable outcomes, and there is a
belief that it is possible to correct or at least accom-
pany the market.
Transitional labour markets
First formulated in 1995, Transitional Labour
Markets (TLM) refers to the development of a sys-
tematic and negotiated management of “transitions”
in and around the labour market. “Transitions” are
understood as any sequence in a personal and pro-
fessional career (Schmid and Gazier 2002).
While the “flexicurity” roots are dominantly eco-
nomic and sociological with a strong connection to
labour law7 and an ethical dimension in the form of
rights and duties, the TLM roots are more diverse
and integrated. It is based, as is the flexicurity
approach, on the economics of institutions and
human resource development, political science and
on Schmid’s (and also Auer’s) former work, which
dealt primarily with policy congruence and comple-
mentarities. Ethics, especially questions of equality,
equity and justice, play a large role in the TLM
approach as well.
The research conducted on labour market policies,
both active and passive, has had considerable impact
on both flexicurity and TLM. The perception of
“transitions” in and around the labour market as a
system, typical of TLM, emphasises the interdepen-
dency between broad activity spheres, such as educa-
tion, job searching, domestic and benevolent tasks,
and retirement.This view has recently been based on
a more micro approach: social risk management
(Schmid 2006), which focuses on the different “fram-
ing” of risk perception by actors.
The TLM approach takes into account the domestic
sphere as a major component of the system of inter-
dependent transitions. The connection to the socio-
logical approach referred to as “life course” (Anxo
and Erhel 2008) is obvious. All this leads to a
stronger emphasis on equality, especially on gender
equality, as a central goal and on the long-term con-
sequences of transitions. The relevant indicators
include many of the preceding indicators assessing
workers’ security as well as the labour market adapt-
ability, but also transition indicators such as transi-
tion matrixes, showing whether individuals are
trapped into dominated and precarious positions or
whether they benefit from opportunities to find bet-
ter jobs and perform chosen activities.
In regional terms “flexibility” is closely linked with
the US labour market and how it compares to
European labour markets. “Flexicurity” and TLM
have their regional origin in the analysis of the
labour markets of “old” member countries of the
EU, and a critical assessment of their success and
failures (Auer and Gazier 2006). This analysis has
been extended to include transition economies, most
of which are now member countries of the EU
(Cazes and Nesporova 2007).
Overlapping, external position and internal
consistency
This short content analysis shows that many ele-
ments (ends, means, indicators and targets) are com-
mon to our four agendas. Even if they have reached
very different stages of development, there appears
to be a kind of continuum. If we start with flexibility,
flexicurity can be seen as an agenda that accepts
some of the priorities of the former while relying on
negotiations between social partners for enriching,
implementing and compensating them. The concerns
of flexicurity are largely shared by the TLM agenda,
which, however, insists on the deliberate manage-
ment of non-paid work and of all the interdependent
spheres of activity. This leads to the “capability”
agenda, which focuses on the deliberate manage-
ment of the preconditions and consequences of
work, either salaried or not.
Besides competition between the agendas, there is
also some degree of overlapping, evident in the com-
mon use of several theoretical references. Sen’s
approach is important for TLM, and the analyses in
terms of “matching” or labour market segmentation
provide resources for the flexibility approach as well
as for flexicurity and even TLM.
Key differences are to be found in the emphasis and
the ranking of causalities or priorities. While a more
precise assessment requires additional research, it is
possible to identify two main sources of diversity in
these political agendas: the first is their external con-
nection to more global agendas; the second is their
internal consistency and degree of homogeneity.
As regards the external connection, let us consider
the importance placed on flexicurity in two wider
policy approaches developed by the European
Union and the ILO. In fact, flexicurity includes all
four objectives of the Decent Work Agenda (work-
er’s rights, employment, social protection and the
social dialogue) and is part of the Global Em-
ployment Agenda of the organisation. Indeed, de-
cent work is the overall ILO strategy for improving
worker’s rights, employment and working conditions
in the world. The overall strategy of the European
Union is the EU’s Lisbon Agenda, a broad strategy
with the ambitious objective of transforming Europe
into “the most productive knowledge economy in
the world by 2010”. It includes all economic and
social policies that might contribute to this aim. The
Lisbon Agenda also has some sub-strategies, such as
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the European Employment Strategy, which encom-
passes flexicurity.
The main part of the Lisbon Agenda includes a
macroeconomic strategy for its 27 member states
that aims at some economic (and social) conver-
gence. It has specific economic targets and to ensure
their achievement, a variety of sanctions. It has some
convergence instruments at its disposal, such as
Structural Funds. This economic dimension is miss-
ing from the ILO agenda. The overall integration of
economic and social policies that the ILO supports
at the country level is achieved at the multilateral
level by all agencies (and their co-ordination) in the
multilateral system. As a consequence, flexicurity is
in both cases a partial and a dominated agenda, a
means rather than an end.
As regards internal heterogeneity, we have already
observed that policy agendas are not unified theories
but more or less complex sets of arguments, most
often based on several theories. They may appear to
be at quite different levels of sophistication and
exhibit more or less internal consistency. If we con-
sider flexibility, the emphasis is initially put on prices
and wage adjustments because they represent the
core market process. But as reality proves “sticky”,
external numerical flexibility emerges as a second-
best priority, and this leads to a more complex and
less stable agenda. In the capabilities approach, the
way labour markets are understood and managed is
something like a black box, even though Sen’s con-
cepts are easily applied to salaried work and take
into account the need to focus on such basics as
health and livelihood in a global context.
How flexibility and security can be efficiently com-
bined is a question that remains unanswered, even
though flexicurity deals with this issue in a case-by-
case approach and TLM analyses can provide useful
insights. In the end we face the tricky question of
causality: if good performance is observed, either in
the labour market or with respect to incomes and the
health of the workers, is it caused by the policy pro-
posals derived and implemented from a given agen-
da or is the reverse true, i.e., that some countries with
good results can afford complex or socially demand-
ing policies? As regards flexicurity and the success of
the Nordic European countries, was it the particular
policy of negotiated flexibility and security that
made adjustments and developments possible or was
it the income and income distribution derived from
sound economic policies that made it possible to
develop flexibility/security policies that finally inter-
acted positively with economic development in this
phase of globalisation?
Is the success of flexicurity sustainable?
The success of flexicurity as a buzzword and a policy
agenda seems related to its intermediate stance
between adaptation to market pressures while main-
taining employment, income and employability secu-
rity and capabilities. A contributing factor to its suc-
cess is also that flexicurity is not a model of labour
market organisation that is shaped by market forces
alone, but that it is a negotiated trade-off and thus
tries to transform a trade-off into a complementari-
ty. Even if firms need security (and workers some
forms of flexibility), the main point is to negotiate
more flexibility for firms and an increase in security
for workers.
In terms of labour market success, countries that are
said to have been able to organise their labour mar-
ket in a way that allow for adjustment and security
are usually top performers. Countries like Denmark,
the Netherlands but also Sweden, Finland and
Austria appear to perform better, when both eco-
nomic and social indicators are measured. Countries
that are usually ranked as “flexibility pure”8 perform
well economically but do not perform as well in
terms of poverty and income equality. Flexicurity
and TLM seem therefore to be more in line with the
goals of the capabilities approach.
In analogy to the financial systems, which today
obviously need more regulation to avoid capital
depreciation, a pure flexibility policy for workers
may likewise lead to the depreciation of human cap-
ital. However, too much regulation would bear – in
the financial sector – the danger of overtightening
credit access for firms and consumers, perpetuating
the crisis rather than solving it. Smart regulation
would be the answer and smartness would imply tak-
ing into consideration flexibility and security needs
of the financial system.
However, even if labour markets are not comparable
to financial markets,9 the re-regulation of the labour
market is also seen by many as the solution to end
the turmoil. Again, while it might be time to focus
more on employment security, adjustment flexibility
is also needed in the labour market. If it is not nego-
tiated, the markets will create it, probably in a nega-
tive way. So this is also the time for the social part-
ners to bargaining for win-win solutions on the
labour markets that consider both the real need for
economic adaptation and for income, employment
and employability security for workers. Rather than
scrapping flexicurity, solutions should be found that
are compatible with the ups and downs of economic
life but that reduce the resulting ups and downs in
social life.
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1 Especially the Stability and Growth Pact criteria are stricter, as is
European legislation in many areas, also in the social and labour
market field.
2 The dominance of a “doctrine” is difficult to establish. For exam-
ple, one of the proponents of what many would call the leading doc-
trine, economic liberalism, Nobel prize winner James Heckman,
criticizes the “prevailing view” in “institutionalists” like Freeman or
Abraham and Houseman, who contend that labour market regula-
tions do not cause high unemployment (Heckman and Pagés 2000).
It seems that both sides make the claim that one doctrine (market
vs. institutions) is dominant.
3 The unweighted ranking of all 15 European countries is 96, the
average rank being pushed up by the high marks given to Denmark
and the UK.
4 The ILO’s constitution from 1919 asserts that “labour is not a com-
modity”.
5 As seen in Wilthagen (2005), and partially also in the TLM and the
capabilities approach.
6 This rather “fatalist” view is implicit in Auer (since 2003) and oth-
ers, although scepticism towards the changes in the labour market
due to globalisation remains, because stability in employment rela-
tions is also a fact of economic life (Auer and Cazes 2003).
7 Labour law, in particular laws regulating hiring and firing, is, of
course, important for all approaches.
8 This is, of course, an exaggeration. The US and to a greater extent
the UK and Ireland also have social policies, albeit not as developed
as in the Scandinavian countries.
9 Cf. again the ILO constitution of 1919.
CESifo DICE Report 4/2008 8
Forum
CESifo DICE Report 4/20089
Forum
